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Credit grantors and employers have two clearly
established methods-- judgmental and empirically derived--of
determining personal financial responsibility that can be
used as a basis for accepting or rejecting credit or job
applicants. This thesis is a literature survey and analysis
of those methods. The foundations of the two methods are
examined and models of the empirically derived method are
discussed.
The paper builds upon the cost considerations and
governmental constraints of the value-maximizing
organization. Operational costs associated with personal
financial responsibility determination methods include
administrative expense, forgone revenue, and asset depletion
due to decision making errors. Governmental constraints
include information gathering restrictions for equal
opportunity and privacy purposes. Applicability of the
private sector methods to the public sector is also
discussed.
The judgmental and empirical methods are each effective.
Their utilization is based upon their respective abilities to
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This paper describes methods used to predict the
likelihood that individual debtors or employees of private
sector organizations will misappropriate proprietary assets
entrusted to them. There may be several methods of
predicting the trustworthiness of individuals with respect to
such misappropriations. Specifically, this paper, which
considers personal creditworthiness equivalent to personal
financial responsibility, is only concerned with those
methods that are used to determine personal financial
responsibility as an indicator of such trustworthiness.
Credit applicants and applicants for positions of high trust
in the private sector are the object of such prediction
processes because they are capable of causing, intentionally
or unintentionally, significant loss to the private sector
organization
.
This paper surveys the literature for private sector
personal financial responsibility determination methods,
describes those methods to the reader, and presents a general
model of the value of such methods
.
This chapter describes the (1) general environment
within which the private sector organization is concerned
with entrusting its assets to debtors and employees, (2)
economic costs of determining personal financial
responsibility, (3) characteristics of personal behavior
associated with methods of determining personal financial
responsibility, and (4) public sector environment for
purposes of comparison to the private sector.
Chapter II presents specific operational problems which
private sector organizations address through their personal
financial responsibility determination methods. Their data
gathering process and specific personal financial
responsibility methods from the open literature are also
described.
B . PROBLEM
This section explains how determining personal financial
responsibility has an economic impact on the private sector
organization. It then discusses how disturbances to
organization assets are affected by the personal financial
responsibility of the debtors and employees entrusted with
them.
1 . Determining Personal Financial Responsibility: A Cost
The private sector grants billions of dollars in
personal credit to generate revenues and profit [Ref. l:p.
28], [Ref. 2], [Ref. 3:p. 327], [Ref. 4:p. 1], [Ref. 5]. It
employs individuals in positions requiring high degrees of
trust to fulfill its missions. Private sector organizations,
therefore, expose their assets to risks of loss through
delinquent loans, bad debts, and criminal activities,
including espionage. To protect those assets, these
organizations attempt to determine whether or not credit and
job applicants should be entrusted with the assets. One
means to accomplish this is by determining the individuals'
personal financial responsibility.
Because of the resources expended in the process,
there are economic costs entailed in determining personal
financial responsibility. These, costs are discussed in
further detail. The methods and costs of personal financial
responsibility determination vary and are controllable [Ref.
6:pp. 113-115]. However, individual behavior and the costs
of governmental requirements are significant external factors
affecting the determination process over which the private
sector organization has little, if any, control.
The goal of private sector organizations is to
maximize their net worth [Ref. 7:p. 11] . Net worth is
maximized by maximizing and retaining profit. Profit is
maximized by generating revenues as long as the costs
incurred to generate them are not greater than the revenues.
At a given level of revenue, costs must be minimized to
maximize profit.
The organization incurs costs when lending money to
credit applicants and hiring job applicants, and saves costs
by limiting these activities. At a given level of revenue,
there is a tradeoff between the costs saved and costs
incurred from these two activities. As will be shown, part
of the costs incurred from debtors and employees is due to
their personal financial responsibility. To minimize total
costs, the organization should accept the level of financial
responsibility in its debtors and employees that can be
expected to maximize differential between costs saved and
costs incurred. Regarding credit granting, Sullivan states,
"In theory, a value-maximizing lender would lower credit
standards for new accounts accepted as long as incremental
revenues exceed added costs of making the loans." [Ref. 8:p.
2] That is, the organization should determine its optimal
level of personal financial responsibility requirements.
A private sector organization formulates policy that
implicitly or explicitly defines requisite levels of
financial responsibility for its credit and high trust
position applicants. The organization then uses some method
to determine that responsibility. If the organization
decides not to consider the personal financial responsibility
of a credit or job applicant, then it in effect has defined
the requisite level of responsibility as that of the minimum
of the applicant population.
2 . Violation of Trust
a . Introduction
If all potential debtors and employees were
trustworthy with respect to the assets entrusted to them by
private sector organizations, then there would be no need to
expend any effort or resources to determine this type of
trustworthiness. However, since this is not the case, the
organization knows that there will be a certain amount of
misappropriation of its assets with which it must deal. This
section describes such realities. It discusses the two
misappropriation modes—intentional and unintentional— so
that the reader understands that there are identifiable
problems that are addressed through personal financial
determination
.
A failure in financial responsibility may be
unintentional, such as a loan delinquency. For example, a
debtor that desires to meet a loan repayment schedule
according to contract may experience an unexpected decrease
in income and become unable to meet the repayment schedule,
b . Fraud
A failure in financial responsibility may be
fraudulent in nature. For purposes here, fraud encompasses
any illegal activity that involves the transfer of
organizational assets to a person or persons by deceptive
means. These activities include blackmail, bribery,
embezzlement, espionage, extortion, forgery, and theft.
Commonly known as white-collar crime, fraud significantly
affects private sector profits: "White-collar crooks bleed
American businesses of an estimated $40 billion a year,
according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce." [Ref. 9] "Fraud
is a... major focus of the business community." [Ref. 10]
Because of the significant economic cost of
fraud, the private sector attempts to control it. Prevention
and deterrence may be attempted through applicant screening,
physical security, and internal controls. However, "There is
probably no better deterrent to fraud than effective and
functional internal controls." [Ref. 10]. For example, at
National Bancshares Corporation of Texas, "employee theft
has dropped in recent years; it credits strong internal and
audit controls." [Ref. 11] In writing on the importance of
conducting audits of the adequacy of personnel information,
Mckee and Bayes state, "Accounting theory indicates that
employment of .. .trustworthy personnel is one of the principal
elements of an effective internal control system." [Ref. 12]
(1) Credit Fraud . What can appear to be
noncriminal violations of personal trust may in fact be the
result of criminal activity because intent to defraud a
creditor is not always apparent. If an applicant's
objective is to defraud the organization without getting
caught in the process, then the individual's means of
achieving that objective would be to successfully meet the
requisite criteria for applicant approval. To do this, the
applicant must become familiar with the organization's method
of processing applicant information used to determine the
presence of the requisite criteria for an evaluation of
financial responsibility. The organization's concern with
credit fraud, then, is that the person committing credit
fraud interferes with or manipulates the organization's
personal financial responsibility determination method.
Credit fraud can permit an irresponsible credit applicant to
be labelled "creditworthy, " when, in fact, the individual
should be rejected.
Applicants with fraudulent intentions are
not easily deterred. Cheng writes, "[Credit] fraud is
difficult to prosecute. Although the borrower ... is part of
the conspiracy, he is not [usually] the principal criminal."
[Ref. 13] As an example, an employee may often be the third
party who accepts payoffs to tamper with consumer credit
ratings. Without the "inside" cooperation of the employee,
the outsider must resort to other fraudulent means.
(2) Bankruptcy Fraud . Another example of a
violation of trust is bankruptcy fraud--a form of credit
fraud. Bankruptcy fraud occurs when the borrower buys goods
on credit, liquidates them, then either skips out or declares
bankruptcy. According to Cheng, "Most scams are the work of
individual con men or debt-ridden [italics mine]
businessmen." [Ref. 13]
(3) Bank Fraud . Employee misappropriations can
be more obviously criminal in nature than those of the
debtor because credit fraud can appear to be unintentional.
Straightforward stealing is epitomized by internal bank
fraud. Although it is bank robbery that is more often
publicized by the press, bank fraud by employees is more than
twice as costly [Ref. 14]. Haas states, "All [the corrupt
bank employee] needs is a way to transfer, substitute, or
conceal funds;... he has become a most prolific thief." [Ref.
15]
(4) Espionage . A violation of trust that can
involve the misappropriation of both private and public
sector assets is the compromise of national security by the
private sector employee [Ref. 16] . The high trust employee
is in a position to engage in espionage. Because the costs
of national security have more impact in society than the
economic costs of any single private sector organization,
espionage may be considered a graver violation of trust than
embezzlement, theft, or other types of fraudulent
activities. In view of the recent espionage cases, Turner's
observations made in 1983 are germane:
Of particular importance is the growing involvement of
private industries in sensitive research and production
contracts awarded by the Department of Defense for both
military and civilian applications. Another factor is the
intensified efforts of hostile and even some friendly
nations to gather technical information through industrial
espionage. In addition, internal crime deterrence and
discovery continue to figure significantly on the list of
managerial priorities. [Ref. 16
J
Turner continues:
Frequently, the questions surrounding these criminal
incidents focus on the effectiveness and reliability of
personnel selection measures . But no technique can
predict future success or criminal action in a precise
manner. Undesirable human characteristics may develop
months or even years after a person accepts employment.
[Personal] financial dif ficulty . .
.
go [es] beyond the scope
of pre-employment inquiries, (italics mine) [Ref. 16:p. 45]
To summarize, credit and job applicants
request private sector organizations to entrust them with
assets. The organizations need to approve applicants to
generate revenues, but know that the likelihood of
misappropriating assets comes with such approval. Such
misappropriations may be intentional or unintentional.
Intentional mis- appropriations are fraudulent in nature and
can involve public sector assets when they are controlled by
government contractors. Private sector organizations use
methods to determine personal financial responsibility as an
indicator of whether or not their assets should be entrusted
to credit and job applicants.
C . PURPOSE
The primary purpose of this paper is to document and
analyze methods used to determine personal financial
responsibility in the private sector and to present a general
model for the value of such methods. A single resource which
surveys the various private sector personal financial
responsibility determination methods currently in use is not
known to exist. This thesis provides such a resource.
To achieve the purpose of the thesis, data were collected
from the following areas: (1) private sector personal
financial responsibility determination methods, (2) public
sector personal financial responsibility concerns, (3)
personal financial behavior, and (4) personal financial
responsibility determination costs.
The determination methods section in Chapter II presents
personal financial responsibility methods discussed in the
open literature. While the focus of the paper is on the
private sector, the public sector overview section
demonstrates the similarity of the public sector's personal
financial responsibility problems to those of the private
sector. Perhaps the application to the public sector of
methods used by for-profit organizations can lead to cost
savings and/or reduced asset loss. The personal financial
behavior and responsibility sections should help the reader
better understand the rationales of the private sector
determination methods surveyed. These sections present the
constraints within which the determination methods must be
formulated. Archival data were gathered for this study from
the open literature.
D. PERSONAL FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICY COSTS
This section presents the cost constraints of personal
financial responsibility determination methods. These
constraints are the risks of asset loss and process expense.
Private sector concerns with asset depletion are presented
first. Specifically, the concerns are with losses
associated with deficiencies in the organization's level of
personal financial responsibility. Then, the expense
incurred to control that level is discussed. Finally, the
optimal combination of these two factors is discussed as a
total cost minimization objective.
1 . Asset Loss
Business risk is the degree to which an
organization's assets are subjected to loss or compromise
[Ref. 7:p. 408]. Assets include cash, securities, equipment,
and proprietary or classified information. Many factors
affect business risk, including the level of personal
financial responsibility.
Organizations that extend consumer credit to generate
revenues or that require high trust positions in the conduct
of operations depend upon personal financial responsibility.
This dependence increases an organization' s business risk
and, hence, expected loss. Debtors are expected to repay
their debts on schedule. And, one can "relate [employee]
position sensitivity to control over corporate assets."
[Ref. 17] For instance, a pharmacist stealing drugs from his
employer and selling them is a particular case in which the
sensitive (high trust) position employee induced asset loss
[Ref. 18] .
Loss, in this context then, is the economic cost of
asset depletion due to the trusting of consumers or employees
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with the security of organizational assets. A case in which
microfiche cards valued from $30 million to over $150 million
were stolen is an example of assets in the form of
proprietary information being depleted due to an employee
trust violation [Ref . 18] .
In formulating policy that defines personal financial
responsibility, the organization is, in effect, establishing
a personal financial responsibility threshold quality that
makes incurred business risk a calculated risk. If that
quality is lowered, assets are exposed to greater risks of
loss. Specifically, "Two components of the added costs of
lowering credit standards are... higher delinquencies and
larger bad debt losses." [Ref. 8:p. 2] As this threshold is
raised, fewer people can meet the criteria. It follows then,
that there is a direct relationship between business risk and
expected loss. Maximizing the threshold quality minimizes
business risk and expected asset loss.
An organization establishes operational requirements
for credit granting and employment to maximize its net worth.
In the short run, consumer demand and labor supply are fixed.
Under such circumstances, as the requirements for the
quantity of people entrusted with assets is increased, the
personal financial responsibility threshold must be decreased
in order to allow a greater quantity of people to achieve the
requisite criteria for meeting that threshold. Hence, the
tradeoff exists between the personal financial responsibility
threshold and expected loss. The private sector organization
can only place its trust in more people if the quality
standards for the threshold fall. But, expected loss will
increase with the added business risk [Ref. 6:p. 113].
The "Expected Loss" curve in Figure 1 shows the
relationship of expected asset loss due to the personal
financial responsibility threshold. A low-level personal
financial responsibility threshold (T, ) allows a high degree
of expected loss (Ljj) due to increased business risk. As the
requisite degree of personal financial responsibility in a
given credit granting or employment situation is increased
(T„)
,
business risk and, hence, expected loss is decreased
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a. Personal Financial Responsibility/Expense
Relationship
As the criteria for the quality of a personal
financial responsibility threshold are increased, so does
the expense of executing the personal financial
responsibility policy. [Ref. 6:pp. 113, 115], [Ref. 20:p.
422], [Ref. 21]. This expense consists of administrative
expense and forgone revenue. Administrative expense entails
the personnel and material resources expended in the
determination effort. Forgone revenue is income that could
have otherwise been earned from loan repayments or employee
production. For purposes of the analysis, it is assumed that
an employee's production directly or indirectly contributes
to organization revenues. Fewer consumer credit and high
trust employment applicant approvals than operationally
required will result in forgone potential revenues and profit
[Ref. 6:p. 116]
.
The "Expense" curve in Figure 2 shows how
administrative expense and lost revenue is a function of the
personal financial responsibility threshold. As the
threshold increases through TL and T„, expense increases
through EL to EH . [Ref. 19]
b. Government Regulation
Organizations are legally bound to the
constraints imposed by government regulation. This section
discusses the various added expenses the private sector
organization faces because of government regulation. It also
reviews the general types of regulation.
(1) Types of Expense . One of the expenses
incurred in determining personal financial responsibility is
the costs of government regulation. Government regulation
affects both the credit granting and hiring practices of
organizations. Also, it impacts administrative expense and
lost revenues. Examples of administrative expense elements
that are affected include direct labor, materials, and
11
services used for the determination methods. For example,
the salary of a person making a credit check and the credit
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Expense as a Function of
Personal Financial Responsibility
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Government regulation affects lost revenue expense by
decreasing the incremental income that could have been
earned, but was not, because regulation slowed down the
determination process for approving loans or employment.
Both compliance and noncompliance with
government regulation result in expenses. Compliance expense
is defined as the incremental cost incurred when a regulation
increases the administrative requirements of the method
process. For example, the cost of ordering new employment
application forms to comply with equal opportunity
legislation would be an administrative compliance expense.
Or, if a loan processor were reassigned to check applications
to ensure compliance, then the income from the loans that
could have been processed if the person had not been
reassigned is a lost revenue expense. Noncompliance expense
is defined as the cost of litigation, penalties, and future
lost revenue.
Peterson argues that consumer credit
regulation costs are very substantial and may add 1 percent
or even more to consumer credit operations cost [Ref . 22] .
He divides these costs of compliance into direct and indirect
costs. He also states that the governmental restriction of
certain types of information significantly reduces the
abilities of creditors to evaluate the future credit risks of
consumers [Ref. 23]
.
Direct costs of compliance are those
involving incremental personnel or supply expenses. They are
incurred to maintain a given personal financial
responsibility threshold. For instance, hiring an additional
person to ensure credit application forms are consistent with
government regulations would be a direct expense.
Indirect costs involve decreases in the
individual productivity of credit evaluation personnel or
increases in bad or delinquent debts. These costs are
incurred from the slippage allowed in the personal financial
13
responsibility threshold. For instance, rather than expend
more personnel effort to ensure credit application forms are
consistent with government regulations, the private sector
organization might simply require less applicant information
for credit approval. That would in effect lower the personal
financial responsibility threshold quality and increase asset
loss risk. Thus, incurring an indirect cost can result in an
asset loss by allowing a lower criteria for personal
financial responsibility. Or, regulation might cause fewer
applications to be processed, resulting in lost revenue.
(2) Legislation . Government regulation of
credit granting and employment is embodied in federal and
municipal legislation. Current legislation is significantly
concerned with consumer rights--specifically, creditor
collection limitations, equal opportunity, and privacy. This
section discusses those areas.
One study indicated that while consumer
complaints were contributory to regulatory legislation, they
were frequently based upon false perceptions of the credit
information system.
Consumers were confused between the functions of
investigative reporting and credit reporting since nearly
30 percent believed that credit bureaus do maintain opinion
information. [Ref. 24:p. 15]
It also indicated that "Only 37 percent of [the] respondents
correctly identified a credit bureau as a record-keeping
agency." [Ref. 24 :p. 3] The study concludes that regulation
influenced by consumers' lack of knowledge increases the cost
of the credit decision process.
(a) Wisconsin Consumer Act. This
legislation (WCA) was enacted in 1973 as pro-consumer
legislation. It limited "the classes of goods and amount of
income that could be taken as security [for consumer loans]."
[Ref. 25:p. 4] Peterson conducted a survey of finance
companies following WCA' s enactment to determine, in effect,




Most [finance] companies operating in Wisconsin tightened
credit availability after enactment of the Wisconsin
Consumer Act. Most cited the WCA (either directly or
indirectly) or increased losses (or inadequate returns) as
the reasonfs] for their actions. [Ref. 25:p. 1]
Such losses are an example of personal financial
responsibility policy indirect costs of government
regulation: more effort was required by finance companies to
process credit applications in accordance with the WCA. As a
result, the application approval rate decreased. Also, bad
loans and delinquent debts increased due to new restrictions
on collateral and collection efforts for approved loans.
[Ref. 25]
(b) Equal Opportunity . Recent changes to
Regulation B [Ref. 26], which implements the federal Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) , are a source of administrative
expense incurred by organizations that must determine
personal financial responsibility. The changes place further
restrictions on the type of information that can be requested
on credit applications. The direct costs of maintaining the
personal financial responsibility threshold with these
changes can be greater than the indirect costs of not
maintaining the threshold [Ref. 22] . As a result, private
sector organizations might allow the threshold for approval
of applicants to decline in order to comply with regulations
and maintain revenues, causing an increase in indirect costs.
Regulation B can also increase direct
costs. For instance, there is the requirement for written
notification to the credit applicant by the organization in
the event of its "adverse action" on the application.
Regulation B affects the credit
evaluation process by preventing credit grantors from using
factors that they believe are relevant and make the process
more efficient and profitable [Ref. 22]. And, for employers,
"The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ... holds that
inquiries about charge accounts, credit and bankruptcy are
evidence of discrimination." [Ref. 15:p. 46] These
15
requirements may be thought of as equal opportunity costs
that affect the cost of determining personal financial
responsibility
.
(c) Privacy. Another cost of government
regulation is that of consumer privacy. The collection of
almost any private information by employers, including
personal financial information, is severely limited if it is
"non relevant." [Ref. 27:p. 21] In this sense, "relevant"
means a valid business reason—a reason which is directly
associated with generating profit. The concept of relevance
and nonrelevance is discussed in greater detail in the next
section of this chapter. Using such information in a
negative way can expose the organization to various
liabilities. For instance, not hiring someone due to their
credit rating "has been found to be illegal unless the
employer can show 'business necessity'." [Ref. 28:p. 91]
Government restrictions designed to
protect consumer privacy may result in a reduction of
applicant information quality and quantity supplied to the
organization. A mistake based upon such insufficiencies of
information can be costly:
Hiring the wrong person .. .means the business will again
have to face the costs of recruiting, screening, and
evaluating. The expense of retraining. . .may equal or
exceed the annual salary. [Ref. 29:p. 84]
Hiring the wrong person because of privacy legislation
restrictions can have additional costs. The organization is
exposed to asset loss from illegal activity and litigation if
it employs personnel with questionable backgrounds [Ref.
ll:p. 56] .
Duffy discusses the need for employers
to recognize legislative constraints when establishing
employment decisions. [Ref. 30 :p. 309] Such restrictions
cause further inefficiencies in the system, increasing
Figure 1 of Reference 15 is a guide to sample
employment interview questions that distinguishes
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory inquiries.
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indirect cost. For instance, an employer may consider adebt-
ridden job applicant not viable for employment due to
emotional distress caused by such financial difficulties.
However, the employer may have to hire the individual,
instead of a more suitable applicant, because of a government
restriction against using such information for employment
decisions. Accordingly, there are lost profit costs from not
hiring an applicant who would prove to be more productive
[Ref . 31:p. 11]
.
Employers must be aware of restrictions
imposed on them to control data gathering from outside
agencies [Ref. 32:p. 69]. Also, there can be severe
penalties to third parties if, without solicitation, they
illegally provide personal financial information to an
employer [Ref. 33] .
Regarding the collection of information
directly by an organization, the Right to Financial Privacy
Act (which does imply the connection between personal
financial responsibility and trustworthiness) prevents
financial institutions from divulging personal financial
records at will just because the information might
accommodate the determination method [Ref. 34]. The Act
provides for the release of protected and unprotected
information to federal law enforcement agencies under
specific conditions.
(d) Noncompliance. As previously
mentioned, there are also specific legally imposed expenses
that can result from noncompliance with government
regulations as well as loss of revenue from reduced
credibility
:
The law is very strict on employers and credit reporting
agencies that willfully fail to comply. In the event or
willful noncompliance , an individual may recover any actual
damages sustained plus the amount of punitive damages a
court awards together with attorney's fees and court costs,
(italics mine) [Ref. 35:p. 279]
For instance, Equifax Services, a national credit reporting
firm, had constraints placed on it by the Federal Trade
17
Commission (FTC) for noncompliance with the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) . In addition to legal fees, Equifax
had to increase its operational direct and indirect costs to
comply with the FCRA. The FTC required Equifax to provide
lesser quantities of more accurate information to its
clients. [Ref. 36]
3 . Total Cost Optimization
The personal financial responsibility threshold
chosen by an organization forces a tradeoff between its
expected loss of assets and its administrative expense and
lost revenue. Figure 3 represents these combined costs with











Total Cost as a Function of
Personal Financial Responsibility
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In fulfilling the objective of maximizing the value,
or in the case of a government agency the utility of the
organization, management should seek to choose a personal
financial responsibility threshold (TQ ) that will minimize
the total cost (Cq) rather than maximize personal financial
responsibility. Increasing required personal financial
responsibility (TH ) beyond the optimal point (TQ ) will incur
marginal expense (EH - Eq) greater than the marginal loss
avoided (Lq - LL ) , increasing net total economic cost by CH~
Cq. Economic profit or net utility is thus reduced [Ref.
6:p. 119]. Lowering the threshold (T,) below T~ will incur
marginal loss (L„ - Lq) greater than the expense saved (EQ-
EL>'
Regarding the incremental administrative cost of
determining personal financial responsibility, Boggess states
that it should only be incurred when the incremental expected
loss avoided will exceed the incremental cost incurred [Ref.
6:p. 115] . For instance, a loss incurred due to a security
compromise should be tolerated if the cost of having used a
higher personal financial responsibility threshold to prevent
the loss would have been greater than the loss is worth.
E. PERSONAL FINANCIAL BEHAVIOR
This section explains why certain behavior is used to
determine personal financial responsibility. It first
explains that population behavioral data are important to the
determination process because of its predictive
characteristics. It then describes what data are important.
1 . Personal Financial Behavior Data
a . Indicator of Personal Financial Responsibility
A variety of human behavioral activity enters
into the personal financial responsibility determination
process. Determination methods must be designed to apply to
general population behavior to avoid discriminatory
accusations. Antisocial (i.e., criminal) behavior is
extreme and not indicative (hopefully) of the general
19
population. Personal financial behavior, though, is a
routine part of everyday life that can be used as a predictor
of personal financial responsibility when utilized as an
input to a determination method applied to the general
population. This section discusses consumer liquidity and
credit use as sample indicators of personal financial
responsibility
.
Credit information helps describe personal
financial behavior:
It tells you two things about a person: how promptly he
pays his bills and his general level or personal
expenditure. The first tells something about his
responsibility; the second, when correlated with his
stated level of income, may or may not indicate possible
conflicting interests. [Ref. 37:pp. 92,136]
Often credit history is checked to determine financial
responsibility. [Ref. 38:p. 58] Comparing one's historical
general level of personal expenditure to one's objectives
may indicate the need for further investigation of the
applicant. For example, if one's lifestyle has recently
demanded an expenditure level of $100,000 a year, then the
objective of applying for a $50, 000-a-year job could be
called into question, possibly indicating potential criminal
activity [Ref. 13:p. 72] . That is, income level and
expenditure level are elements of personal financial behavior
data that should be examined and compared to each other for
indications of personal financial responsibility or conflict.
Cash shortage is the reason consumers decide to
become credit applicants in the first place [Ref. 39:p. 1.].
Credit is used by households to finance consumable
expenditures beyond the capabilities of their cash assets.
Normal liquidity can be defined as having enough cash on hand
to cover contingencies in the absence of regular income for
what the household considers a reasonable period of time
(e.g., six months). Excess liquidity covers any unplanned
loss of regular income beyond such a period [Ref. 39:p. 2].
Logically, households with excess liquidity would use the
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excess for consumable expenditure prior to using credit.
This is based upon the premise that the cost of consumer
credit is greater than the income derived from liquid
investments or savings.
Households short on liquidity must either use
consumer credit to make up the shortage or decrease spending.
The cost of borrowing increases total nondiscretionary
household expense which further aggravates the liquidity
shortage. Further consumable expenditure becomes even less
affordable as liquidity decreases. An irony of personal
financial behavior occurs in the credit granting arena:
Relative to income, those that can least afford consumer
credit need it the most
.
Sexton attempted to discover criteria that can
identify relatively good credit risks among low-income
families [Ref. 40:p. 236]. He statistically evaluated 14
personal behavior variables used by large credit granting
retailers to determine which variables have potential as
indicators of personal financial responsibility. His sample
consisted of those already approved for credit; therefore,
much of the variables' indicator potential was filtered out.
Few significant differences were found in the usefulness of
the variables between high and low income families. Having
had a credit investigation or having a checking account were
two predictor variables for both high and low income families
as good credit risks. But, these variables were more
significant as predictors of good credit risk for the low
income families than they were for the high income families.
The study also showed that the presence of income beyond that
from the head of household' s primary occupation was not an
important variable for predicting the personal financial
behavior of either group [Ref. 40:p. 239]. This parallels
Sullivan and Drecnik' s study which found "the probability of
household debt use... was not [italics mine] significantly
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associated with the level of household income." [Ref. 41:p.
31]
Bowers and Crosby examined the financial behavior
of low income consumers to identify variables that explain
their behavior. As part of their study, the consumers were
trained in and screened for credit card use prior to
receiving the cards. Bowers and Crosby suggest that the
variables of banking affiliation (for example, Sexton's
checking account variable) and knowledge of one's credit card
account served as measures of traits which are associated
with one's ability to become more financially stable. [Ref.
42:p. 98]
b . Sources and Uses
This section discusses general population
financial behavior information that can be externally
obtained. This information can be used by the organization
as a comparison standard for its determination method. The
section then describes categories of behavioral data of
interest to organizations.
Prior to developing a method of determining
personal financial responsibility, the private sector
organization must either develop internally, or obtain from
an outside source, the requisite personal financial behavior
data. There exists a sizable database of consumer financial
behavior [Ref. 43]. The primary sources are surveys,
statistics, and special studies developed by both the public
and private sectors. The Federal Reserve Board and the U.S.
Department of Commerce are the major contributors of general
population consumer financial behavior information.
A private sector organization can use statistical
data descriptive of personal financial behavior to formulate
policy that defines requisite degrees of financial
responsibility for its credit and high trust position
applicants. And, it can use this data to continuously
monitor that trustworthiness.
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Moran, et al . [Ref. 5] state, "of potential
utility in discriminating good from bad risks ... is .. .personal
data supplied by the applicant for a loan." They conclude
that there are specific personal financial behavior factors
that differentiate good from bad credit risks, the most
significant of which is "buying a home of relatively high
value." The authors also found, however, that there "is the
lack of differential prediction associated with the
variables sex, marital status, old or new customer, and
collateral in the form of goods vs. cosigner's guarantee."
However, because their study, like Sexton's, was limited
only to data from already approved applicants, they admit
"the paper's findings [were] tentative and suggestive rather
than definitive." [Ref. 44:p. 59]
Updegrave [Ref. 45] lists some of the significant
personal variables of concern to consumer lenders
:
- Number of creditors
- Credit payment history
- Suits, judgments, and bankruptcies




- Checking or savings account
- Homeowner vs . renter
2 . Risk Variables
a . Relevance
Personal financial behavior can be categorized
by personal trait variables. Some variables (e.g. having a
credit card) are obviously financial in nature. Others (e.g.
age) are not. In developing a method of determining
personal financial responsibility, the organization should be
concerned with incorporating those variables in its model
that are clearly relevant. Relevant variables are those the
organization requires to effectively execute its
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determination method. Organizations can learn from either
experience or statistical studies which variables are
relevant
.
Moran, [Ref. 5], Sexton [Ref. 40], Sullivan and
Drecnik [Ref. 41], and Bowers and Crosby [Ref. 42] are
examples of statistical studies that provide organizations
with knowledge of which personal trait variables are
relevant. For instance, Moran' s study concluded that age,
income, automobile age, and home ownership were relevant
variables. Sullivan and Drecnik suggest that a consumer's
after-tax cost of credit is an indicator of the probability
of credit use.
By definition, irrelevant variables will add
nothing positive to the determination process. They can
inadvertently take on unwarranted significance which may lead
to either of two types of errors: Type I—rejecting
financially responsible applicants or Type II—accepting
unqualified applicants as financially responsible. These
errors can make the model less efficient by adding clutter,
"noise," and administrative expense to the model. More
importantly, though, is that the occurrence of these errors
can have deleterious effects on the determination method.
Because the errors have costs associated with them, they
affect the organization's wealth by forgoing revenue because
of a Type I error or by increasing asset loss due to a Type
II error. It is clearly beneficial, then, to identify
variables of personal financial behavior as either relevant
or irrelevant.
One way to determine the relevancy of a personal
trait variable is to evaluate it independently of other
variables by assessing the risk associated with the variable
compared to the population at large. For example, if a
survey showed that 30 percent of the people who have felony
convictions were debt-delinquent, one's first reaction might
be, "People who are convicted felons are not financially
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responsible," and that a felony conviction is a relevant
variable. However, if it was also known that the same
behavior was indicated by about 30 percent of the population
at large, then the variable should be considered irrelevant.
Variable relevancy is dynamic and should be
continuously reevaluated. Peterson points out that,
"occupational and employment credit risk varies over time as
the business cycle




Complex personal trait variables consist of two
or more simple traits. Understanding the correct usage of
complex financial behavior variables in a responsibility
determination model is critically important. For example,
being a convicted felon and coming from a broken home is a
complex variable. Though each simple trait may be irrele-
vant, combined, they may become a relevant complex variable.
Peterson demonstrated that simple trait risks are
not necessarily additive [Ref. 23:p. 14] . He combined the
relevant positive occupational category of managers and
foremen with the relevant negative employment category of
manufacturing. This combination resulted in a complex
variable that indicated a higher level of personal financial
responsibility than the occupational trait did alone.
Similar results were achieved with other occupation-
employment category combinations such as professionals-
manufacturing and professionals-banking, finance, and real
estate. Peterson argues that occupational and employment
information are relevant indicators of income stability.
c Debt Delinquency
Debt delinquency is a personal trait variable
that is of obvious concern to the creditor. In exchange for
credit, borrowers agree by contract to specific repayment
terms. Adherence to repayment terms can be one indicator of
trustworthiness, though not an assurance of it. Embezzlers
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may have no problem paying their bills. Repayment
delinquency, however, definitely violates the creditor's
trust placed in the debtor. A generally responsible person
may have very tenable reasons for such delinquency. However,
by definition, the individual has indicated a decreased level
of personal financial responsibility simply because of the
delinquency
.
Sullivan's study discusses the borrower's
"economic incentive to default on credit contracts when
perceived costs of default are lower than costs of staying
current on the loan." [Ref. 8:p. 4] That is, the debtor
weighs the personal economic cost of future difficulties in
obtaining credit, with legal matters, and with loan
collection efforts against the cost of properly repaying the
loan. The debtor then prefers to choose the least costly
alternative. .
As Sullivan mentions in the study, deterioration
of future credit availability is one cost of default. A cost
not within the scope of the study is that "of the
deterioration of personal trustworthiness resulting from the
decreased level of financial responsibility demonstrated by
the debtor's default. Additionally, if the delinquent
consumer feels pressure by the creditor to become current,
the individual's employer may become the victim of internal
fraud because of delinquency induced temptations.
Generally, the average consumer debt delinquency
rate is a function of the business cycle [Ref. 8] . The rate
is especially sensitive to the unemployment and inflation
rates. Consumer liquidity is also affected by such
macroeconomic conditions and in turn affects consumer debt
delinquency. In the aggregate, the consumer liquidity-to-
consumer credit outstanding ratio was fairly steady from 1963
to 1974 [Ref. 39:p. 4] . "Double-digit" inflation in the late
seventies caused the ratio to rise until the 1982 recession
hit the national economy. In a 1983 survey by the Federal
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Reserve Board [Ref. 39:p. 17], liquidity was shown to be
directly proportional to average household income, which is
affected by the inflation and unemployment rates . The
national average for the debt-to-income ratio increased 76%
from .105 in 1950 to .185 in 1975, indicating that in to the
mid-seventies, while income and debt were increasing, so was
liquidity and the ability to repay debts on schedule [Ref.
46] .
The relevance, then, of a debtor's delinquency
should be measured with current macroeconomic conditions in
mind. In Sullivan's analysis of composite delinquency rates,
she found that debt burden, as a ratio of consumer debt to
disposable income, was significantly and positively
associated with consumer debt delinquency rates [Ref. 8:pp.
12,25,26] . As one would probably suspect, a consumer's debt
burden is a relevant personal trait variable for predicting
debt delinquency.
Raske's study suggests that specific socio-
familial personal trait variables are relevant indicators of
potential debt delinquency. He states,
...debt delinquency is related to structural factors within
the family, that potential [italics mine] delinquency can
be detected with adequate statistical reliability by
knowing what those factors are. [Ref. 46 :p. 39]
That is, internal family dynamics such as marital stress or
educational level can have a marked influence on personal
financial behavior. Debt delinquency may be a symptom of
internal stresses beyond the expected financial indicators:
Financially dysfunctional families strongly tend to lack
planfullness [sic]
,
possibly because they strongly tend to
lack goals. Leadership in these families is "sort" or non-
existent. Role flexibility is low and roles tend to be
stereotyped. Money management is the concern of one spouse
("My wife takes care of the bills.") Family organization
tends to be simple rather than complex.
Raske continues:
Consumer credit is a popular stress-relief device with some
addictive qualities, not at all unlike whiskey, especially
where problems of self-esteem are present. [Ref. 46 :p. 40]
This emphasizes the criticality of evaluating the relevancy
of trait variables that are indicative of personal financial
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behavior yet not necessarily financial in nature. Some of
these that Raske mentions are [Ref. 46:p. 46]:
- Debt is usually incurred by one spouse only
- Such debts are paid by the other spouse
- Denial of need for credit
- Nonspecific family goals
- Above average number of children
- Children close in age
- Married young
- Parents' education below local average
- Job prestige below local average
d . Bankruptcy
Creditors and employers should be concerned
about which relevant personal behavior variables can be used
as indicators for potential bankruptcy filings. When debtors
desire or require protection from the demands of their
creditors, they have the option of filing for bankruptcy.
Obviously, creditors realize total or partial loss of assets
entrusted to debtors that do file. Also, if employees are
insolvent, but desire to avoid filing for bankruptcy, the
employees may be subjecting themselves to greater temptations
of committing fraud. Employers realize increased risk of
asset loss under these circumstances.
The Credit Research Center at Purdue University
conducted a survey to determine, among other things,
bankruptcy petitioner demographics. Describing the modal
petitioner, the study summarized:
...the petitioners were primarily heads of households of
young families. ...most likely to have a high school
degree, be employed in an unskilled labor position,
and report family income of $5,000 to $10,000 per year
[ (1981) ] . Households had at least one person [presently]
employed full time and expected family income to increase.
In contrast to the national sample [of households with
consumer debt outstanding] .. .the petitioners were younger,
and were less likely to be married. Most were in the prime
family formation years. [They] were much less likely to
own their own homes. [Ref. 47:pp. 17,18]
More importantly, primary causes leading to
petition for bankruptcy were typified:
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The path to bankruptcy .. .was paved by an inordinately heavy
use " of consumer credit relative to family income.
Petitioners had credit from a multitude of sources but were
frequent users of unsecured credit from medical sources,
dealers, retailers, friends, and others. Those who had
consumer instalment debt which totaled more than 100
percent of family income were heavy users of those sources
of debt. ...most frequently indicated. .. [as] the most
important cause of bankruptcy was a medical problem, a
marital problem, loss of job, or excess use of credit.
Forty percent ... filed. . .to avoid paying a particular
creditor. [Ref. 47:p. 61]
Another study by the Credit Research Center found
that consumer debt burden and short-term economic outlook are
relevant personal trait variables indicative of personal
bankruptcy [Ref. 48:p 15]. From these studies it appears
that the private sector organization must not only be
concerned with an individual's level of debt, but the reasons
for the debts (e.g. medical expenses) and the number of debts
as potential personal trait variables.
F. PUBLIC SECTOR OVERVIEW:
PERSONAL FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY and COST
This section describes the similarities and differences
the public sector experiences with personal trustworthiness
as compared to the private sector. The violation of trust,
its cost implications, and sample proposals to reduce cost
are described.
1 . Violation of Trust
The same asset loss that the private sector incurs
from people who violate its trust plagues the public sector
as well. Public sector loss additionally includes the
implicit cost of compromise of national security information.
This applies even when the information is controlled by
government contractors in the private sector because such
losses affect national security. Such loss typically
involves classified information provided to or developed in
the private sector under government contract. Other loss
includes technology transfer. The only loss to the private
sector organization is the actual dollar cost of assets,
penalties, and lost future revenues. However, the implicit
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cost to the nation is that of the damage to national
security
.
The Defense Investigative Service (DIS) is the DOD
agency that is primarily concerned with the determination of
personal trustworthiness of military and civilian personnel
in DOD and the defense establishment [Ref. 49]. Credit




virtually every espionage case in the past decade has
involved financial motivation. Whether driven by need or
greed, these spies sold the secrets entrusted to them for
ard, cold cash. [Ref. 50]
Allen and Polmar corroborate this by arguing that financial
gain was the most common motivating factor in the many recent
espionage cases [Ref. 51:p. 282]. Some costly espionage
cases of current notoriety include Miller, Pelton,
Walker/Whitwofth, and Pollard [Ref. 50]. Walker is believed
to have received more than $1 million over a period of a
decade. [Ref. 21:p. 7]
Another current case, though not believed to involve
espionage, does involve murder and robbery in DOD. Ruben
Colon is a Navy petty officer in the Electronic Warfare
rating. That job specialty requires him to have or have had
a "secret" security clearance. Colon is alleged to have
murdered his ship' s disbursing officer while robbing him of
ninety-five thousand dollars and twenty-six hundred treasury
checks. [Ref. 52]
2 . Optimize Cost
Figures 1-3 apply to government and private sector
activities as well. However, it might be argued that the
government should not optimize personal financial
responsibility, as shown in Figures 1-3, for the following
reasons: (1) the government is not concerned with profit and
(2) the issue of national security mandates personal
financial responsibility be maximized. However, though it is
true that profit is not a governmental objective, cost-
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efficiency is. Activities operating under budget constraints
must necessarily be concerned with cost minimization. [Ref.
53 :p. 121]
It might be analytically difficult or even
politically inappropriate to assign a monetary value to
public sector loss. However, "it is necessary that dollar
values be assigned to the various resources .. .that ... reflect
the value of the benefits that could otherwise be produced."
[Ref. 53:p. 122] If cost-benefit analysis is to be applied
in determining optimal personal financial responsibility
levels for the government, then assignment of some dollar
value approximation to implicit cost is essential [Ref. 47 :p
125] .
Differences between the public and private sector in
the positioning of the "Expected Loss" curve of Figure 3
would be significantly affected by the sizable dollar values
assignable to national security breaches. Such losses would
pivot the curve upward compared to the less severe private
sector expected loss curve. This, in turn, would shift the
total cost curve upward and to the right, as shown in Figure
4. Relative to private sector levels, increases would result
in the government's optimal personal financial responsibility
threshold level from Tq to Tq and optimal total cost from Cq
to Cq. This change is beneficial because as it is made, the
marginal loss the government would avoid (1^ - Lq) by sliding
down the expected loss curve is greater than the marginal
expense incurred (Eq - E^
.
For the same reasons as the private sector, the
optimal rather than the maximum or ideal level of personal
financial responsibility should be sought by the government.
The benefits of achieving a level beyond the optimal would be
far outweighed by the incremental costs. The Department of
Defense (DOD) estimated that an annual expenditure of $80
billion would be required "to perform a full investigation,
complete with field interviews, of all personnel and
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contractors who have access to classified information."
[Ref . 21] .
To reduce public sector asset losses, Rosa [Ref. 50]
proposes that personal histories of credit, bankruptcies,
real and personal property titles, household finances,
incorporations, expense records, income tax returns, large
bank transactions, and passports and visas be subject to
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Figure 4
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Effects of National Security Losses on Public Sector
Optimal Personal Financial Responsibility
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To reduce expense, the Fair, Isaac Companies recently
proposed a fully integrated computerized credit evaluation
system for DIS. The company provides customized systems of
this sort to the private sector for credit granting purposes.
For DIS, it would be a decision support system "used to
obtain and interpret credit reports for subjects of personal
security clearance investigations." [Ref. 54:p. 1-1]
The system would primarily reduce administrative
costs by reducing the number of processing personnel and the
time required per routine investigation. Additionally,
management would easily be able to change the personal
financial responsibility level programmed into the system.
The proposal is designed to pivot the "Expense" curve down-
ward, as shown in Figure 5. This would also shift the "Total
Cost" curve downward and to the right, again increasing the
government's optimal personal financial responsibility level
to Tq while decreasing its total cost to C«. This change is
beneficial because the marginal loss the government would
avoid (Lq - L«) by sliding down the expected loss curve is
greater than the marginal expense incurred (EQ - Ej.) .
G. SUMMARY
Private sector organizations place the security of their
assets in the hands of debtors and employees to generate
revenues or conduct operations. To control their risk of
asset loss due to loan default or employee fraud, these
organizations try to evaluate the trustworthiness of credit
and high trust position applicants. One way they can do this
is by determining individuals' financial responsibility.
Maximizing the requisite level of personal financial
responsibility minimizes the risk of asset loss. But,
determining and establishing personal financial
responsibility levels incurs the costs of administrative
expense and forgone revenue. In accordance with the
organization's goal of maximizing its wealth, it should set a
policy that minimizes its total cost. This can be
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accomplished by selecting an optimal personal financial
responsibility threshold.
The public sector risks greater loss than the private
sector due to the potential damage to national security. If
the public sector quantifies its potential losses, it can
also benefit by using private sector personal financial
responsibility determination methods and choosing an optimal
trustworthiness level.
The next chapter surveys which methods are used to








Effects of Expense Efficiencies on
Optimal Personal financial Responsibility
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II . ANALYSIS
A. PROBLEMS REQUIRING PERSONAL FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
DETERMINATION
1 . Introduction
Chapter I discussed the problem of organizational
asset loss due to the violation of trust. The chapter raised
the questions: (1) Why, (2) How, and (3) To what extent
should personal financial responsibility be determined by an
organization?
This chapter discusses operational problems facing an
organization that can be addressed by the personal financial
responsibility determination process. Specific incidents of
trust violations are presented to demonstrate the necessity
to develop realistic determination methods that effectively
control the organization's level of personal financial
responsibility
.
2 . Credit Risk
If a value-maximizing retailer believes that revenue
can be significantly enhanced at a marginal cost that is less
than the anticipated marginal revenue, then that marginal
cost should be incurred until it equals marginal revenue
[Ref. 55:p. 434]. The retailer may believe that the marginal
cost incurred to grant credit may be less than the marginal
revenue generated in doing so, and, therefore, decide to
become a credit grantor.
Credit grantors incur a marginal cost of capital
loaned, which represents the opportunity cost of the next
best investment alternative the credit grantor has available
for the cash being considered as a loan [Ref. 7:p. 346],
[Ref. 53:p. 118]. That alternative might be the reduction of
the credit grantor's own indebtedness. Or, it might be some
investment with a higher return, but too high a risk to be
considered preferential.
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There are two basic types of consumer credit
grantors: (1) retailers that finance the credit sale of
their products or services themselves and (2) financial
institutions that provide cash to finance credit sales . One
difference between them is that
Merchandising concerns can cancel future credit before the
debtor's sum has escalated to significant proportions. In
the small financing sector, however, this control is absent
in that an appreciable sum commences the transaction.
[Ref. 5]
For example, a department store that provides revolving
credit to its customers is in effect providing credit on
demand up to a limit (e.g., $100 per month with a $300
maximum balance) . For the merchandiser to continue providing
that limit, it must be satisfied that the consumer has proved
to be creditworthy based upon the past performance of the
credit agreement. Otherwise, the store can prohibit
additional credit purchases. A finance company, however, is
providing a single sizable loan (e.g., $1000) all at once,
allowing itself less control over the debtor once the loan is
executed.
The credit granting retailer has two ways to recover
the cost of capital loaned. One way is to apply an interest
rate to the loan that is equal to or greater than the return
associated with the next best alternative investment. The
other way is to apply a lower rate, but have the interest
differential imputed in the sales price of the product.
Only the first method is available to the financial
institution. The latter method is not available to the
financial institution because there is, in this case, no
product or service being sold by it other than money lending.
However, some cost can be recovered in the guise of loan
origination fees. Since the private sector organization must
recover all costs to be profitable, including the cost of
capital loaned, incurring such costs also incurs the risk of
nonrecovery of them. The risk of nonrecovery of the cost of
capital loaned is defined as credit risk.
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The cost of capital loaned is recovered through loan
repayment. Therefore, credit risk is manifested as the
expectation of loan delinquency and bad debt. Since credit
risk is an expectation of asset loss, the "Expected Loss"
curve of Figure 1 is similar to the credit risk behavior
curve for the credit grantor. As the personal financial
responsibility threshold is decreased and more credit is
granted, greater expected loss in the guise of cost of
capital loaned is incurred.
In order for the credit grantor to formulate a
reasonable policy for the amount of credit it will grant, it
must have an idea of its optimal personal financial
responsibility threshold. As shown in Figure 3, this
requires knowledge of the expected loss (credit risk) curve.
That is, the credit grantor must be able to reasonably
predict credit risk at various credit granting levels to
determine the optimal amount of credit to grant. Expected
nonrecovery of the cost of capital loaned as a function of
credit risk is shown in Figure 6 as the "Credit Risk" curve.
As credit risk approaches a maximum moving from R, to Rj,,
expected nonrecovery of the cost of capital loaned also
increases moving from L, to L„ respectively. Because the
quantity of credit provided is inversely proportional to the
personal financial responsibility threshold defined for the
population of interest, credit risk is a problem that can be
addressed by the determination of personal financial
responsibility as discussed in Chapter I.
3. Fraud
a . Introduction
In addition to the credit risk problem, private
sector organizations are subject to the risk of loss due to
fraud. Fraud costs the American private sector upwards of
$50 billion per year [Ref . 56] . Because fraud is a costly
violation of trust often committed by debtors or employees,
any organization has an interest in determining their
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debtors' or employees' trustworthiness. As discussed in











Expected Nonrecovery of the
Cost of Capital Loaned as a
Function of Credit Risk
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b . External Fraud
External fraud, such as shoplifting or industrial
espionage, is committed by people not employed by the
organization. However, such problems cannot be addressed by
personal financial responsibility determination methods
because of the lack of any formal "applicant" relationship
the organization has with the perpetrator. The organization
has no means of gathering predictive personal trait variables
about the person before such acts are committed. However,
such problems can be addressed by physical security measures.
Credit fraud is a particular type of external
fraud that can be addressed by personal financial
responsibility determination methods. Information on the
person committing credit fraud must have first been processed
through the organization's credit application process.
There are a variety of credit fraud schemes.
Many are designed to defeat the organization's personal
financial responsibility determination method. Fischer
reports
:
"In most [credit fraud] cases the applicant is trying to
avoid association with an adverse credit record. You can
be certain that these individuals have only one purpose in
mind: to get something for nothing." [Ref. 57 :p. 113]
A private investigator of credit fraud states:
The ripoff [sic] artists are having a field day, and, in
their eagerness to make a buck, business people often
become tneir own worst enemies by making themselves
attractive targets. .... You can^t always allow past
performance to dictate present policies. Clever operators
may take a year or longer to set up a good "sting"
operation. [Ref. 58:pp. 34-36]
For example, the perpetrator may order merchandise on credit
and make timely paymencs, gradually building up credibility
with the creditor. Then, a large amount of credit will be
used and the person will skip out.
A problem credit executives face is that it's possible to
fake records, misleading a standard ratings bureau and
making one's creditworthiness appear stronger than it is.
.... Sometimes people aren't even who they say they are.
[Ref. 58:p. 35]
Often, the birth certificate of a deceased person is
obtained, allowing the applicant the use of fraudulent
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identification. Credit may then be given to a "nonexistent
person." [Ref. 59:p. 47]
"Many times the names used are fictitious," says [a bank
card application processing company] , "while in other
situations a person gives a valid name... with a bogus
address or fictional credit references. There are cases
where an applicant claims to work for a particular employer
. .
.
[who] has no knowledge of that individual .
"
[Ref. 57:p.l8]
c . Internal Fraud
Internal fraud is committed by an organization's
employees. The greater the amount of assets entrusted to the
employee, the greater amount of fraud the individual has an
opportunity to commit.
An employee must first go through a job
application process, giving the organization an opportunity
to gather personal trait variables . As an example of why
certain personal traits, such as age, are of interest, "a
study of 453 employees caught stealing from their company
showed that 90% are under 30 years old." [Ref. 60]
Collecting such data permits the application of methods to
help determine the job applicant's personal financial
responsibility. The methods can also be applied to employees
already in positions of high trust to monitor and update
their trustworthiness. For high trust employees,
Continual evaluation is necessary. Specific verification
techniques include credit checks and review of charge
accounts and bankruptcies, when permissible by law.
[Ref. 15]
Even though credit fraud is primarily external,
it can be internal because high trust employees are capable
of committing it. For example,
Tampering with consumer credit ratings is one element of
credit fraud. Employees in some credit agencies .. .are on
the payroll of a criminal ring. They have been paid to
scrub the records of persons who are willing to pay a fee
for a good rating. [Ref. 13:p. 10]
Another kind of internal fraud is bank fraud.
Internal bank fraud is attractive because in many cases it
simply involves the movement of information rather than
physical goods or currency to transfer assets. For instance,
embezzlers were recently caught stealing $69 million from the
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First National Bank of Chicago [Ref. 61:p. 45]. They used
computers to transfer funds to their own account at a bank in
Vienna. Haas states:
Internal bank fraud is a rather simple clandestine
operation for the dishonest employee and often the computer
is his best friend and accomplice. Even your most trusted
employee may be tempted to embezzle money if his need is
great enough, or if the opportunity presents itself. There
is no single criterion to be used in the detection of
dishonest employees. [Ref. 15:p. 45]




One measure of the level of trust required by a
position is the amount of asset loss the employee in the
position can cause. That is, the sensitivity level of the
position is affected by the amount of assets under the
employee's purview. For example, a bank teller with access
to thousands of dollars in currency might require more trust
than a receptionist. Therefore, the teller would be in a
more sensitive position and be given more trust in order to
perform the job.
A job description does not necessarily articulate
the sensitivity level of the position. Kent writes, "people
in the most menial jobs can cause serious damage: the guy
pushing the broom after hours, for instance, could be an
industrial spy." [Ref. 9] High trust employment, then,
involves organization personnel in positions such that they
can cause serious asset loss to the organization. Therefore,
the higher the sensitivity level of the position, the




There are massive fraud losses suffered by the
private sector. If the organization desires to avoid such
losses, it can use either preventive or punitive measures or
a combination of both to do so. Regarding punitive measures,
a reluctance to prosecute, in many cases, is due to bad
publicity and the legal expense of recovery. Preventive
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measures, however, are more desirable because the
organization avoids the loss of assets and does not have to
incur the costs of recovery. Advocating preventive measures
regarding internal bank fraud, Haas suggests that the
anticipation of problems and their prevention via pre-
cautionary measures is better than waiting for something to
happen [Ref . 15] . And, Kent also argues that prevention is a
better strategy than going to court for recovery [Ref. 9].
A procedure many organizations use in hiring high
trust employees is the background investigation. To be
effective in helping to determine personal financial
responsibility, the background investigation should include
the applicant's financial situation to determine financial
stability [Ref. 62] . Credit checks are typically made part
of the background investigation in order to accomplish this.
Proper and adequate background investigations are
not only a necessity, but also the most cost-effective part
of personnel employment screening [Ref. 62] . They can be
used to validate the information supplied by the job
applicant. For example, First National Bank of Atlanta has
background and credit reports conducted by an outside agency
to discover applicant fabrications [Ref. 63]. Falsification
of a job application may in itself be a predictor of a
personal trustworthiness problem. It is not unlikely that
there is a connection between falsifying a job application
and employee theft [Ref. 12] . Certainly, such a
falsification would at least be an overt act of mistrust on
the part of the applicant [Ref. 35:p. 277].
Even with application validation, the potential
for fraud still exists [Ref. 64] . The primary concern for a
background investigation, here, is for the organization to
discover any potential abnormalities that may give rise to
the applicant exploiting opportunities to violate the trust
given because of financial difficulties. As a preventive
measure, "The credit check is run because a person who is
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heavily in debt is more likely to steal than one who is not."
[Ref. 65:p. 53]
As part of the background investigation, the
credit check provides the organization with essential
personal financial behavior trait variables. Debt, debt
delinquency, bankruptcy, and other indicators of financial
difficulty are warning signs to the organization. However,
it is perfectly reasonable for an applicant with financial
difficulties to be scrupulously honest and trustworthy.
Also, financial difficulties can be the result of unforeseen
economic circumstances beyond the control of the applicant
who used reasonable foresight. Downplaying the implications
of inadvertent difficulties, Menkus reports,
"the existence of personal financial difficulties should
not bar an otherwise qualified applicant from employment.
But the employer may find it wise to be aware of some of
the pressures under which someone in a sensitive position
may have to work." [Ref. 17]
B. PERSONAL FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DETERMINATION METHODS
1 . Introduction
The ultimate test of a determination method is how
well that method differentiates between bad and good credit
or employment risks [Ref. 66:p. 22] . This section presents
methods of personal financial responsibility determination
identified in the open literature.
In any group of people there will be those who are
and who are not trustworthy enough for either credit or high
trust employment. Regulation B, which implements the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, was discussed in Chapter I.
Although Regulation B does not define explicitly the
meaning of creditworthy and noncreditworthy applicants, it
implies that an absolute dichotomy could be made between
these two groups. It often is inferred that credit-
worthiness is an individual trait that can be measured by
an absolute standard: those that are creditworthy pay all
their obligations as agreed and those that are noncredit-
worthy do not
.
Creditworthiness is not an individual trait that can be
measured by an absolute standard. [It] should be
considered to be the probability that an applicant will
exhibit a future payment behavior satisfactory [italics
mine] to the creditor. [Ref. 66:pp. 16,17]
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The determination of one's personal financial
responsibility is a decision process that lends itself to a
logical flow. Chandler and Coffman describe the credit
decision process as shown in Figure 7. This process applies
regardless of the method of executing it. Chandler and
Coffman state that in deciding on a method to execute such a
process, "The profit motive causes creditors to seek an
evaluation system that minimizes the economic costs






























[Ref. 66:p. 16] These errors, incorrectly denying (Type I)
and granting (Type II) credit, and economic cost minimization
were discussed in Chapter I. The cost of a Type I error is
the lost profit that could have been generated from forgone
credit granting revenues. The cost of a Type II error is the
potential nonrecovery of the capital loaned.
2 . Governmental Constraint and Method Definition
Data collected internally for the credit evaluation
process are generated by the organization querying the
applicant. There are two methods of obtaining the data from
the applicant (1) questionnaire and (2) personal interview.
A combination of these two methods of data collection may
often be used.
The personal financial responsibility determination
processes which may be used are constrained by government
regulation. Process methods are defined by the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act. It specifies only two legitimate methods of
determining personal creditworthiness: judgmental and
empirically derived (credit scoring) [Ref. 67:p. 73]. The
judgmental method is the process by which a decision maker
uses personal experience and knowledge to qualify applicant
information, compare it to a standard, and formulate a
decision. The empirically derived (i.e., credit scoring)
method is the process by which numerical weights are
assigned to quantify applicant information and compare it to
a standard for a preformulated decision.
Regulation B prohibits illegal discrimination and
restricts applicant information that can be construed as
discriminatory. It also requires the application of an
"effects test" to the application process to determine the
validity of a decision criterion despite possible
discriminatory effects. For example, refusing credit to
people living in low income housing is not valid because it
is discriminatory in effect to a class of consumers—those
living in low income housing. The effects test, then, is a
45
process by which a decision criterion is examined for the
existence of a valid business reason for its use in order to
legally continue the criterion's use. [Ref. 67]
The gist of the effects test is that it is possible to
discriminate against a group of people protected by the
ECOA without ever intending to do so. Although the effects
test concept originated in the employment area, there is
little doubt that it applies to lending as well. [Ref.
67:pp. 73,75]
3 . External Personal Financial Behavior Data
Chapter I discussed the sources and uses of general
population demographic data and applicant-supplied (i.e.,
internal) personal data concerned with personal financial
behavior. There are both intentional and unintentional
biasing of data on the part of the credit or high trust
position applicant. Therefore, internal data alone are
insufficient to accurately determine personal financial
responsibility. To complement internal data, the private
sector also obtains personal financial behavior data not
supplied (i . e .. , external) by the applicant. Such information
helps provide the organization with a more objective input
to and output from its personal financial responsibility
determination method.
Credit bureaus are a primary source of determination
method external input data [Ref. 66:p. 18]. Looking beyond
the routine credit check provides the credit grantor or
employer with information of a more comprehensive nature:
There is an even more powerful tool available for use in
the employment process: employers have a statutory right
to receive an investigative consumer report from a credit
bureau--a report not merely of credit standing, but of
character, general reputation, personal characteristics,
and mode of living obtained through personal interviews
with neighbors, friends, or associates of the individual
being reported on. [Ref. 35:p. 279]
The public record is a rich and valuable source of
external personal financial behavioral data. It provides
access to even more detailed applicant information if the
organization desires it.
The quantity of information made available under the
Freedom of Information Act and other state legislation is
immense. Comprehensive financial investigative reporting
can be compiled by using public records. [They help in]
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locating assets, obtaining background information, and
performing preemployment checks. Public records and some
of their uses [include]
:
- Corporate records [filings] . . . to determine corporate
affiliations.
- Limited partnerships and assumed name filings... to
determine what other names a subject might be conducting
business under.
- County and state UCC (Uniform Commercial Code) filings...
in obtaining financial information, tracing assets, and
locating previously unknown activities
.
- Tax rolls... in locating assets, .. .and investigating the
background of individuals.
- Real property records... in locating assets.
- Liens and judgments ... in determining the credibility of
an individual
.
- County, state, district, and federal court (civil)
records can help determine the credibility of an
individual
.
- Criminal court records are valuable in preemployment
checks and background investigations.
- Miscellaneous personal records include voter
registration^ marriage licenses, and city directories...
[in] obtaining personal information ... such as date of
birth, social security number, and home address.
- Vehicle information ... in locating assets as well as
locating the subjects themselves. [Ref. 68]
4 . Judgmental Method
a . Introduction
Of the two general methods of determining
personal financial responsibility, the judgmental method is
the oldest. This section describes the judgmental method.
In the hard sciences (e.g., physics) the
probabilities of effects occurring are highly predictable
when using known input variables (e.g., time) . In the social
sciences the probabilities of effects occurring can only be
estimated using known input variables (e.g., number of
children in family). [Ref. 69:p. 30], [Ref. 70:p. 52]
No two people are exactly alike, even if they are
similar in some ways. Therefore, the average behavior of a
category of people does not necessarily indicate the behavior
of a particular individual within that category.
Consequently, determining personal financial responsibility
is an inexact science. Since the organization deals with the
individual applicant, not categories of applicants, it should
concern itself with evaluating and predicting individual
performance. [Ref. 66:p. 23] Individual evaluation helps
avoid discrimination via stereotyping. The individual's
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behavior may change over time, but those changes are not
necessarily constant nor predictable with a significant
degree of confidence [Ref . 69]
.
The judgmental method attempts to predict the
individual' s financial responsibility. The prediction
process combines the decision maker's experience in and
knowledge of societal financial behavior to formulate a
standard against which the individual's credit risk is
measured.
The decision maker gradually acquires experience,
but the experience gained from his/her last decision can be
thought of as incremental. The judgmental method
incorporates the decision maker's personal incremental
experience into the credit decision process.
Relevant experience is generated by the decision
maker's past production record of good and bad credit
decisions regarding applicants. However, Chandler and
Coffman state that the judgmental method focuses on
information biased heavily towards past bad accounts and on
"maintaining an acceptable loss rate, rather than on finding
ways to change or improve on past performance." [Ref. 66: pp.
19,20]
The decision maker combines his/her corporate
experience with internally and externally generated applicant
financial behavior data. Internal data may be generated
either from questionnaires or interviews. The combined
experience and information is "processed" by the analyst to
determine the applicant's level of personal financial
responsibility. The credit granting decision is then made
based upon the decision maker's comparison of that level with
the organization's personal financial responsibility
threshold.
Chandler and Coffman summarize the judgmental
method as follows:
The judgmental credit evaluation process has been the
traditional method of evaluating credit applicants. A
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credit analyst examines the credit applicant's character-
istics, evaluates , the applicant's creditworthiness, and
decides to approve or to decline the applicant. Thejudgmental process is based on the experience and humanjudgement of the individual analyst. The judgmental system
also may incorporate "rules" and other non-empirically
derived credit guides established by company policy,
(italics mine) [Ref. 66:p. 17]
b. Decision Making
The judgmental method largely involves human
interaction to make individual judgments. Individual
judgment has significant potential to use irrelevant personal
trait variables in the decision making process. The greater
amount of irrelevant information present, the greater the
likelihood that some of it will be used [Ref. 66:p. 20] .
Therefore, the greater the degree that the decision making
process is judgmental, the more crucial is the need to avoid
irrelevant information. At the same time, the quantity of
relevant information required to evaluate the subject of the
decision (i.e., credit or job applicant) increases with the
degree of human interaction in the decision making process.
Because the judgmental method of credit
evaluation is entirely human-interactive, it requires the
collection of a substantial quantity of applicant information
to accumulate relevant personal trait variables. Since raw
information contains irrelevant as well as relevant data,
this requirement also increases the presence of irrelevant
variables. The risk of using irrelevant variables and the
exposure of the decision process to Type I and II errors
increase as the credit decision process becomes more
judgmental [Ref. 66:p. 19]. There is a tradeoff between the
quantity of relevant information collected and the
probability of avoiding errors. As the quantity of relevant
information collected is increased, so is the probability of
committing errors due to the corresponding increase in
irrelevant information.
As a means of generating relevant internal
information, the judgmental method readily lends itself to
open questioning.
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Open questioning is where the applicant is engaged in a
conversation about the topic in hand. There is no
predetermined indicators or what are 'desirable', and
* objectional' responses during open questioning. [Ref. 69]
Open questioning is generally acknowledged as being a more
superior method of eliciting information than closed
questioning. It allows the respondent to explain things in
his or her own words: things they may otherwise find
difficult to explain. Open questioning engenders a feeling
of relaxation and casuatLness in the respondent while the
interviewer can assess the stability, responsibility, the
attitudes and motivations of the respondent. [Ref. 69]
The applicant is treated as an individual with unique
requirements, qualifications, problems, and capabilities.
For instance, the interviewer may ask the applicant about
intentions for the use of a product being bought on credit.
Treating the applicant as an individual, which may or may not
favor the applicant as far as a decision is concerned, allows
the applicant the opportunity of self expression. Also, if
the applicant is not approved by the judgmental method, the
applicant may have the opportunity to obtain a specific
"individualized" reason for the rejection. In using open
questioning, the organization must be careful to avoid
reaching the point of applicant discrimination that implies
an equal opportunity violation. [Ref. 28], [Ref. 69]
The decision maker's level of experience is a
crucial factor in the judgmental method. Experience can act
as a filter of irrelevant information. Information may
contain nonquantifiable relevant variables that give the
experienced decision maker the opportunity to arrive at a
more confident decision than would otherwise be possible
[Ref. 66:p. 20], [Ref. 69:p. 29]. For example, applicant
behavioral attitude during open questioning may provide the
decision maker with an uneasy feeling about granting a loan
even though other relevant variables indicate the applicant
is creditworthy.
Lack of experience on the part of the judgmental
decision maker can cause the analyst to distort the
importance of relevant personal trait variables and give
importance to those that are irrelevant. This may result in
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stereotyping and Type I or Type II errors [Ref . 66:p. 20] .
The resultant stereotyping may or may not be discriminatory
with respect to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
If the inexperienced judgmental analyst is
concerned about maximizing the wealth of the organization, as
his organization's incentives should have him be, then
his/her personal biases should be set aside to avoid any
significant stereotyping. Such objectivity should allow the
judgmental method of determining personal financial
responsibility to produce a more just decision for the
applicant and a more profitable one for the organization.
Decision making should be based upon the applicant's personal
financial responsibility and contribution to organization
wealth, not upon assignment to irrelevant categories due to
stereotyping.
Using closed questioning tends to categorize
people rather than "individualize" them. Therefore,
interpreting information gathered through closed questioning
tends to stereotype the applicant rather than provide an
"objective assessment" of the individual [Ref. 69] . Hall
states :
Stereotyping is a consequence of holding preconceived views
that hypothetical attributes and shortcomings can be
subscribed to certain types of people. [It] is based on
the notion that as certain manifestations are indicative of
behavior, then the character of a person can be judged by
such manifestations solely, without taking into consider-
ation any other factors. [Ref. 69:p. 28]
Interpreting that most people who live in $200 thousand
houses are more creditworthy than those living in $100
thousand houses would be an example of stereotyping via
categorization. Closed questioning easily facilitates such
categorization [Ref. 69].
Closed questioning resulting in stereotyping may
in effect cause discrimination in an equal opportunity sense
while purporting to be scrupulously nondiscriminatory in
accordance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act . The
interpretation of information obtained by closed questioning
51
may be discriminatory because of the failure to recognize the
complexity of personal trait variables. For example, the low
income farmer may in fact be a better credit risk than the
high income stockbroker. But the organization may consider
high income applicants better risks than low income
applicants and stockbrokers better risks than farmers.
Considering these factors independently of others, closed
questioning may not reveal the farmer as the better risk.
The organization's determination model would have to
specifically recognize the particular complex variable low
income farmers for the better decision.
Closed questioning is not sensitive enough to recognize and
differentiate between differences in social ' values,
customs, demarcations of legal definition, the ability or
inability of a particular person to express themselves, and
the use of symmantics [sic] to hide or enhance a particular
situation. ...generally closed questioning is an
incomplete method of data gathering. [Ref. 69]
The essential point is that the judgmental method is able to
use personal trait variables that are not necessarily
quantifiable. The ultimate value of this is measured by the
method's, effectiveness in determining personal financial
responsibility
.
5 . Empirical Method
a . Introduction
Credit scoring has been defined as "a system that
mathematically accepts or rejects credit or loan applicants
by weighting [sic] certain characteristics before granting or
denying credit." [Ref. 67] That is, unlike the judgmental
method, the empirical method, in its purest form, does not
concern itself with the individuality of the applicant.
Credit scoring is an empirical method of
determining personal financial responsibility. It is the
newest method and involves quantification of the applicant's
personal trait variables to arrive at a score for the
individual. The score is compared to a required standard to
determine applicant approval [Ref. 66:p. 17]. Normally, the
evaluation is structured so the higher the score, the lower
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the risk assigned to the applicant. The organization's
weighted average applicant score should not fall below the
organization's score-based personal financial responsibility
threshold if it is to maintain that threshold. This section
describes empirically derived models found in the literature.
Credit scoring attempts to accelerate and
automate the credit decision process. Weingartner describes
the development of a credit scoring model as a two part
process: (1) the statistical derivation of personal trait
variable weights and (2) setting a threshold for applicant
approval. Applicants scoring below the threshold would not
be approved [Ref . 70] . The objectives of the method are to
increase process efficiency and effectiveness by replacing
human interactive decision making involved in each
application (i.e., judgmental method) with a preformulated
decision process [Ref. 66], [Ref. 70], [Ref. 71].
Process efficiency is increased with the
empirical method because less information is required for
process effectiveness. Less information is required because
the organization's model can be designed to use only relevant
personal trait variables. Data gathering for the process via
closed questioning fulfills this requirement. Also, the
human effort normally expended with each application is
reduced. Human effort is directed more towards entering data
into the process mechanism (e.g., a computer) than it is
towards actual evaluation and decision making [Ref. 71 :p.
36] . Therefore, more applications can be processed using
this rather than the judgmental method. [Ref. 72] . At a
given personal financial responsibility threshold, the
organization's process expense per applicant is reduced,
reducing total credit granting cost and allowing a subsequent
increase in the threshold to a higher level, as shown in
Chapter I, Figure 5.
Process effectiveness is increased because the
organization's personal financial responsibility policy and
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threshold are quantified and, therefore, more easily defined,
adjusted, and adhered to for optimal performance. For
instance, two criteria may be established—minimum individual
score to be accepted and minimum average score to be
maintained. For example, organization policy might state
that, for approval, no high trust position applicant's score
shall fall below 75. And, the personal financial
responsibility threshold for all such employees must be an
average score of at least 80. That is, the organization's
average score for high trust position employees must be high
enough so that a high trust position applicant with a minimum
allowable score of 75 can be hired as long it does not cause
the organization's average score to fall below 80. Using the
two parameters maintains minimum acceptability while at the
same time ensuring individuals with higher scores are
employed. The threshold can be adjusted to an optimal level
as the expected loss and expense curves change. However,
since those changes may only be estimates, there may be some
doubt as to the amount of change required for the threshold
to be at an optimal level [Ref . 2] .
b. Method Objectivity
The judgmental method is generally considered to
be subjective and the empirical method objective [Ref. 66].
This section analyzes the objectivity of the empirical
method. Specifically, process errors and their costs,
statistical analysis of variables, asset loss and expense
estimation, economic conditions, equal opportunity, and
consumer privacy are examined as factors that influence
method objectivity.
Chandler and Coffman cite several actual
comparisons of the process effectiveness of the empirical and
judgmental methods [Ref. 66:pp. 22,23]. The evidence
indicated (but did not prove) that the empirical method is
the more effective one on the average. That is, using credit
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scoring resulted in a lower rate of Type I and Type II
errors. However, it was also noted that:
with a system that is based on average performance of
accounts over the past [i.e., empirically derived, ].. .the
system cannot predict the performance of each credit
applicant. Credit scoring, like any other method of
evaluating creditworthiness, will make errors. ....
there may be specific cases in which judgmental evaluation
is superior to empirical evaluation. [Ref. 66:p. 23]
The process is considered empirically derived because it is
based solely upon the observation of quantifiable personal
trait variables without considering applicant qualities, such
as moral character and integrity [Ref. 66] . For instance, a
credit applicant may have the character, capacity, and
collateral to justify loan approval, yet a low score given to
a personal trait variable (e.g. home ownership) might
disqualify the applicant, resulting in a Type I error.
The behavior of the costs of Type I and II errors
is analogous to the "Expense" and "Expected Loss" curves,
respectively, in Figure 3 when the "PFR" axis represents
credit score. An optimal score-based threshold for
applicant approval should be set where the marginal costs of
Type I and II errors are equal. Since it is more likely that
more creditworthy than noncreditworthy applicants can achieve
the higher scores, raising the threshold would incur more
Type I errors than the Type II errors avoided. Since it is
more likely that fewer creditworthy than noncreditworthy
applicants can achieve only the lower scores, lowering the
threshold would incur more Type II errors than Type I errors
avoided [Ref. 74] . Figure 8 shows how (1) credit applicants,
(2) credit approvals (3) Type I and Type II error costs, and
(4) combined costs are distributed by credit score.
While the execution of the credit scoring process
itself is objective in nature, the empirical method does not
actually escape subjectivity. Criticizing the presumed
objectivity of the method, Hall states:
All credit scoring does is to substitute the 'characters of
words' for the 'characters of figures' [sic] . It is not an
objective assessment, as the numeric variables used, and
the parameters within which they are used, are determined
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by the opinion of the person calculating the numeric values
that are attached to pieces of information. In other words
the variables and parameters are set subjectively,
(italics mine) [Ref. 69]
And corroborating this, Updegrave writes, "The weight given
to each scoring question depends on the particular creditor's
experience and judgment ." (italics mine) [Ref. 45:p. 145]
The relevancy, and therefore the relative weight, of a
personal trait variable may be determined objectively by
statistical analysis. However, the criteria to achieve a
given score for each variable is subjectively determined when
the credit scoring model is formulated and updated [Ref. 73].
The estimation of the probabilities of effects occurring is
manifested as the sum of subjectively determined scores
assigned to each independent personal trait variable.
Taking relevant personal trait variable
complexity into consideration prior to summation of scores
will improve estimation [Ref. 23:p. ii]
,
[Ref. 70]. This can
be accomplished with multivariate discriminant analysis.
This technique of statistical analysis can be used to
separate members of a population (e.g., credit applicants)
into mutually exclusive groups (e.g., good and bad credit
risks) by evaluating the predictive effects of complex
variables on the population [Ref. 74]
.
A weakness of multivariate discriminant analysis
of credit evaluation models is that the historical database
it uses is normally based upon the personal trait variables
of approved credit applicants only. While this is practical,
an unbiased "through-the-door" population would allow the
analysis to provide a more accurate picture of each
variable's significance [Ref. 73]. To be unbiased, the
population of interest should include rejected credit
applicants as well as those approved. This, of course, is
prohibitive in most cases due to the improbability of
determining whether a rejected applicant would have been a
good or bad credit risk.
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An additional subjective factor that impacts the
objectivity of the empirical method is the judgment used in
constructing expected loss and expense curves. As a result,
setting an optimal personal financial responsibility
threshold requires judgment, as does setting the minimum
required (cutoff) score for an individual applicant's
approval [Ref. 7:p. 690]. Since construction of the expected
loss curve is influenced by macroeconomic conditions,
judgment can be used to adjust the cutoff score and
compensate for macroeconomic conditions [Ref. 75]. Setting a
cutoff score for an applicant's approval can only be
considered objective in the sense of being consistently
applied.
Because credit scoring is based solely upon
specific quantifiable variables, the method can eliminate
equal opportunity discriminatory variables (e.g. sex) from
the organization's scoring model [Ref. 76:p. 39]. This can
give the method the appearance of being nondiscriminatory.
However, because the process uses closed questioning, which
can stereotype people by traits, it has a greater probability
of failing the effects test and therefore of being
discriminatory. For example, the practice of assigning a low
score to the variable previous home ownership may at first
seem to have a valid business reason because of statistical
evidence to that effect. But applying the effects test might
reveal equal opportunity discrimination in view of
demographic studies. Such studies may indicate, for
instance, that single women tend more than the population at
large to be renters rather than homeowners. Assigning a low
score to the variable mentioned, in such an instance, would
in effect be discriminatory against single women and
contribute to their rate of rejection, despite the applicant
questionnaire not inquiring as to the applicant's sex—an
inquiry which would have been overtly discriminatory.
58
Credit scoring tends to be more protective of
applicant privacy for several reasons: (1) the process is
less human interactive during applicant inquiry, (2) less
information is required of the applicant for process
effectiveness, and (3) applicant information is quantified
rather than qualified by the process. That is, the applicant
is represented by a score rather than by characterization of
the individual
.
c . Credit Scoring Models
Specific credit scoring models designed for
individual private sector organizations are proprietary
information. It is unlikely that such information would be
released for dissemination by the organization [Ref. 77].
Updegrave notes, "Lenders are notoriously tight-lipped about
which items they consider most significant." [Ref. 45 :p.
146] This section, then, is limited to general credit
scoring models surveyed in the literature. It describes a
sample selection of these models.
(1) Credit Screen . Boggess (1967) presents a
general credit scoring model that focuses on deriving an
optimal credit applicant cutoff score. While credit scoring
is designed to evaluate the probability of a debtor being a
good or bad credit risk, the model Boggess describes also
"provides management with an ability to refine its policy
continuously to produce optimum profits." [Ref. 6:p. 114]
That is, the cutoff score is adjusted for profit
maximization. The model accomplishes this by minimizing the
combined costs of Type I and Type II errors. Boggess
considers such cost avoidance added profit. [Ref. 6]
For simplicity, the model is a purely
mechanical process. No investigation is made into applicants
scoring below the cutoff. This prevents further reduction of
Type I error costs, but avoids administrative expense.
[Ref. 6]
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Boggess acknowledges that in developing a
more comprehensive model: (1) incremental administrative
expense must be compared to the respective incremental
benefits if further applicant investigation is made, (2)
factors such as time, product, and geographic region affect
the cutoff score, (3) personal trait variable relevance
varies by market segment, (4) no model can predict a
particular applicant's personal financial behavior with
certainty, and (5) any credit scoring model is pointless if
it does not reduce uncertainty in the credit granting process
as compared to the judgmental method. [Ref. 6]
The first step in developing a specific
model in this mold is to evaluate the relevancy of personal
trait variables to good and bad credit risks. This is done
by (1) gleaning variables from current debtor accounts, (2)
determining the frequency of each variable's occurrence by
known good and bad accounts, (3) using multivariate
discriminant analysis to evaluate the ability of each
variable to discriminate between good and bad accounts, and
(4) assigning weights accordingly.
In choosing which variables to use in the
model, the importance of complexity is stressed. Boggess
writes,
To make the most efficient use of the multiple-
characteristic approach, the most significant
characteristics among the dozens available must be selected
and mixed in the right proportions at the time an
application is screened. [Ref. 6:p. 116]
The next step is to determine an optimal
cutoff score for applicant approval/rejection. This is done
by (1) taking another sample of known good and bad accounts
and assigning scores to them using the personal trait
variable weights derived from the statistical analysis done
on the original accounts, (2) ranking the accounts by score,
(3) listing the cumulative number of good and bad accounts at
each score, (4) calculating the total net profit added for
each potential cutoff score by rejecting all applicants below
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that score, and (5) choosing the score with the highest
profit added.
This model is a simple, yet effective,
application of the empirical method. It provides for
efficient, "hands off, " decision making in an uncomplicated
credit granting environment where personal trait variables
are easily identifiable, relevant, and highly discriminatory
between good and bad risks.
(2) Credit Analysis Model . Hentenhouse and
Wentworth (1971) describe a general model they call the
Credit Analysis Model. It has two basic processing phases
which combine the empirical method's "objectivity" in the
first phase with the subjectivity of the judgmental method in
the second. [Ref. 78]
The first phase of the Credit Analysis Model
is to automatically classify applicants into one of three
categories—accept, reject, or evaluate further. This is
done by assigning a credit score to the applicant based upon
weights derived from statistical analysis (specifically,
stepwise linear regression) . The score is then compared to
a high score for acceptance and a low score for rejection.
If the score is between the high and low decision scores, the
application is sent on to the next phase for further
evaluation
.
The model's accept and reject scores are
based upon current good and bad account score distributions.
As shown in Figure 9, these distributions overlap one
another, indicating the potential tradeoff between Type I and
Type II errors. The model achieves maximum ability to
discriminate good and bad risks at the two scores where the
overlap and the total number of Type I and Type II errors is
minimized for applicants accepted or rejected in phase I.
Applications referred to further evaluation
are subjected to the judgmental method. The decision maker
has three sources of assistance at this point to decide upon
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acceptance or rejection of the applicant: (1) evaluate the
significance of personal trait variables not included in the
scoring model, (2) determine the significance of the score's
proximity to the acceptance or rejection scores, and (3)
compare the applicant to similar past cases. If this phase
is unable to produce a confident decision for the
organization, then further investigation using additional
external data may be attempted.
The Credit Analysis Model takes advantage of
both the empirical and judgmental methods of credit
evaluation. While the empirical phase leaves a number of
applications undecided, the ones that are accepted or
rejected are done so with more confidence than a model using
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a single cutoff score. Decisions in that phase are based
upon scores with greater discriminatory powers. A weakness
in the model, however, is that the objective is based upon
the minimization of the total number of Type I and Type II
errors rather than the total cost of those errors. This is
only valid in the instance of all loans being of the same
value. Otherwise, the distribution in Figure 9 should be in
quantity of dollars rather than applicants.
(3) Decision Tree . Conventional credit scoring
sums relevant variable scores and is only concerned with the
total score. This allows groups of applicants with
significantly different behaviors to arrive at the same score
and be considered equivalent risks.
Makowski (1985) describes a special type of
empirical method model that groups applicants with
significantly common behaviors using decision tree logic.
The model's process forces applicants to be routed along a
"branch" to a distinct subgroup of applicants with a unique
set of behaviors and a unique risk probability. [Ref. 80]
The decision tree process is similar to
credit scoring in the way it statistically derives weights of
relevant personal trait variables to assign probabilities of
effects occurring. Additionally, however,
a process called augmentation is used to infer what the
performance of those applicants rejected in the past would
have been had they been accepted. This is important, since
the system is designed to apply to all applicants, not just
those who resemble the ones approved in the past. [Ref. 80]
Once weights are derived, a decision tree is
"grown" by assigning conditional probabilities of effects
occurring along each "branch, " terminating at a unique
subgroup of applicants with common personal trait variables
and weights. The conditions are the traits of the previous
subgroup. For instance, in Figure 10, an applicant with the
personal trait variable "under 30 years old" is assigned a
probability of 0.20 where loan default is the effect. This
probability is only valid in the condition that the applicant
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is also a homeowner. The weighted average probability of
loan default for all subgroups immediately under the
homeowner variable is 0.12.
An advantage of the decision tree model over
conventional credit scoring is its attempt to evaluate
variable weights based upon all applicants in the population,
not just those applicants approved. The main advantage,
though, is that it eliminates a crucial defect normally
present in credit scoring—the inability to take relevant
variable complexity, beyond that evaluated by statistical
analysis during the model formulation process, into effect.
'Bad"
Probability
Source: Reference 80, Figure 1.
Figure 10
Sample Decision Tree for Bad Risks
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Makowski states, "[credit scoring] systems assign the same
number of points to an attribute irrespective of the number
of points assigned to other attributes." [Ref. 80]
However, the decision tree model assigns a probability of an
effect occurring to an attribute only after consideration of
the previous
attributes. A decision tree model allows the decision maker
to examine the effects of variable complexity as it occurs
instead of just seeing "the bottom line." For example a
credit scoring model might assign ten points to anyone over
30 years old. The decision tree sample in Figure 10, though,
would first consider whether or not the applicant was a
homeowner before considering the applicant's age. The credit
grantor' s judgment does come into play in deciding upon a
default probability cutoff point.
(4) Modified Discriminant Analysis . An early
credit scoring study reported by Myers and Forgy (1963)
indicated that statistical analysis modified by repetitive
application to selected accounts can increase a model's
ability to discriminate low score applicants [Ref. 81].
The study first selected 300 finance company
accounts— 150 currently good and 150 known bad. It then
developed a basic model by first analyzing forty-one personal
trait variables associated with the 300 accounts. Twenty-one
of the variables were statistically significant in
discriminating accounts as either good or bad and assigned
weights accordingly. A new sample of 300 accounts (150/150)
were then subjected to four independent methods of
statistical analysis to determine each of the methods'
predictive ability in evaluating accounts as good or bad.
The four methods were conventional discriminant analysis,
stepwise linear regression, equal weighting, and "modified"
discriminant analysis. Three of the methods used the 21
relevant variables and their weights derived from the first
analysis. The stepwise regression reduced the number of
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required variables for good/bad discrimination to 15. The
modified discriminant analysis was applied to the 250 lowest
ranking good and bad accounts (125/125) to derive a new set
of variable weights for revised ranking. The accounts were
rescored using the newly derived weights. This process was
repeated at the 200, 150, 100, and 50 lowest ranking account
levels for good and bad accounts. The report does not make
clear whether the repetitions were independent or
incremental . A variety of cutoff scores were examined to
determine the number of Type I and Type II errors made by
each model.
The results of applying the four scoring
models that used weights developed from the first sample of
300 accounts to the second sample is displayed in Table 1.
The relative ability of each of the four models to
discriminate the second sample of 300 accounts by their
TABLE 1
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proper grouping (good or bad) is indicated by the cost of
eliminating Type II errors in terms of incurring 0, 1, 5, 10,
and 20 Type I errors, respectively.
The results indicate that when the cutoff
score is not or only slightly increased (i.e., the and 1
good cases eliminated column) , the modified discriminant
analysis model is more efficient in reducing the number of
Type II errors. For example, with no increase in Type I
errors (0 good cases eliminated) the model eliminates 24 Type
II errors for the 150 lowest ranking cases analysis compared
to only 15 Type II errors eliminated for the stepwise
regression model.
Results of the application of a modified
discriminant analysis to the lower scoring accounts were
"encouraging." The study shows that designing a model to
improve discriminatory power specifically targeted at lower
scoring accounts can reduce Type II errors at little or no
cost [Ref. 81]. Such "fine tuning" of credit scoring models
allows the organization to further reduce the total costs of
personal financial responsibility determination at an optimal
threshold.
(5) Expected Profit . Myers (1967) presents a
model developed to determine an optimal cutoff score for an
organization's loan portfolio. By first calculating the
expected profit from each loan approval, the expected profit
for its portfolio could be determined by summing the
individual expected profits. [Ref. 82]
In the developmental phase of the model, and
prior to using credit scoring, it is assumed that all loan
applications are approved. Expected profit is calculated
using the expression:
EP = m P - m- P^, where EP = expected profit,
m = profit potential of a good loan,
P = probability that a loan is good,
m^ = loss potential of a bad loan, and
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Pb = probability that a loan is bad.
P and P^ are ratios representing past experience with good
and bad accounts, respectively. An example of applying this
simple model is: if a one year, $100 loan at 15 percent
simple interest is being considered, P = 0.95, and Pj^ =
0.05, then EP = ($15) (.95) - ($100) (.05) = $9.25.
To maximize expected profit, a credit
scoring model is now utilized so that an optimal cutoff score
can be identified. This is done by calculating the
portfolio's expected profit for each score as if it were the
cutoff score. Table 2 shows what a typical schedule of these
values might look like. The loss avoided by establishing a
cutoff score is considered a benefit which is added to profit
from the good accounts accepted. Losses from incremental
Type I and Type II errors resulting from use of the model are
subtracted frOm the expected profit at each cutoff score.
For example, assuming a cutoff score of seven causes the
model to accept 77 percent of the good applicants and reject
70 percent of the bad applicants, then:
EP 7 = (.77) ($15) (.95) (77% of the good accounts accepted)
+ ( .70) ($100) ( .05) (70% of the bad accounts rejected)
- ( .23) ($15) ( . 95) (23% of the good accounts rejected)
- ( .30) ($100) ( .05) (30% of the bad accounts accepted)
$9.69.
The score with the highest calculated expected profit is the
optimal cutoff score. In Table 2, the optimal cutoff score
is six because its expected profit of $11.70 is highest.
The value of this model comes not from the
good accounts accepted, because they were already being
accepted prior to the model's development and use. Rather,
the value is derived from the rejection of bad accounts that
would have been accepted without the model's use (i.e., Type
II error reduction) . However, resulting Type I errors do
detract somewhat from the incremental expected profit derived
from the model's use.
68
TABLE 2
EXPECTED PROFIT AT EACH SCORE















Source: Reference 82, Table 2.
C. SUMMARY
Credit grantors incur the risk of nonrecovery of the cost
of capital loaned due to default and various types of
external and internal fraud schemes. The level of such risk
is measured by the amount of funds loaned and the applicant's
probability of being a bad risk. Such probabilities are
related to the applicant's personal financial responsibility.
Employers also incur the risk of asset loss due to
internal fraudulent behavior. The level of such risk is
proportional to the level of assets entrusted and the
employee's probability of being dishonest. Such
probabilities may also be related to the applicant's personal
financial behavior. Employers recognize that the prevention
of asset loss through employee screening is more effective
than punitive measures when all costs are considered.
Private sector organizations desire to minimize all costs
any given level of revenue generation. Costs include the
depletion of assets entrusted to approved credit or job
applicants. To minimize such costs, organizations may use a
cost-benefit approach. This is done by comparing the
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marginal costs of administrative expense and forgone revenue
to discriminate good applicants from bad ones to the marginal
costs of asset depletion avoided by such discrimination
efforts. The objective of the costs of applicant
discrimination is the determination of applicant financial
responsibility. The ultimate objective is to reduce asset
depletion costs by a greater amount than the marginal costs
incurred to do so.
Private sector organizations determine the personal
financial responsibility of credit and job applicants,
respectively, to approve or reject them. These
organizations generate internal and external applicant
information for the execution of the decision process. They
have two clearly established methods of determining the
personal financial responsibility of their applicants:
judgmental and empirically derived. Governmental regulation
defines these methods and constrains the latitude within
which organizations can process applications with respect to
equal opportunity and privacy.
The judgmental method is the traditional method. It is
used for determining personal financial responsibility unless
a decision is made to adapt an empirically derived model for
the process. The judgmental method process is slow because
the decision making is entirely human interactive and treats
each applicant as an individual for evaluation purposes. It
incorporates the decision maker' s experience and knowledge to
evaluate qualitative applicant information in arriving at an
approve/reject decision.
The empirical method is the newer method. The empirical
method can be faster than the judgmental method because it
minimizes human interaction in the decision making process by
replacing human evaluators with automatic data processing.
The process assigns each applicant to group membership,
simplifying the individual evaluation process. Once an
empirically derived model is developed and implemented, the
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method automatically evaluates quantitative information and
compares the applicant's score to a cutoff level for a
decision
.
There are a variety of empirically derived models, each
attempting to provide the decision maker with a means of
minimizing the combined costs of rejecting good applicants
and accepting bad ones.
D . CONCLUSIONS
The judgmental method of determining personal financial
responsibility tends to have relatively low fixed costs and
high variable costs compared to the empirical method.
Capital investment is minimal and analysts can be utilized
for evaluation and decision making as required. As the rate
of applicant evaluation increases, human resource (i.e.,
variable) costs also increase.
The empirical method tends to have relatively high fixed
costs and low variable costs compared to the judgmental
method. Capital investment in automatic data processing
hardware and software can be substantial . As the rate of
applicant evaluation increases, human resource costs are not
significantly impacted because of the relatively small degree
of human interaction required for the process.
Method selection, itself, should be subjected to cost-
benefit analysis. Primarily, an organization should evaluate
the expected marginal benefits from a change in the process
and compare them to the costs required to make the change.
The evaluation can lead to a number of recommendations.
Possibilities include:
(1) improve current judgmental procedures,
(2) introduce empirically derived procedures as an addition
to the current judgmental system,
(3) replace the current judgmental system with an
empirically derived system,
(4) improve current empirically derived procedures,
(5) introduce judgmental procedures as an addition to the
current empirically derived system, and
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(6) do not alter the current system.
In conducting a cost-benefit analysis of possible changes
in the current method used to determine personal financial
responsibility, the organization must consider interdependent
factors that affect the marginal fixed and variable costs of
making the changes. These factors are applicant volume and
processing rate and the cost of Type I or Type II errors.
Increasing applicant volume taxes the evaluation system.
To maintain process effectiveness under such conditions, the
system must increase its processing rate so that applicants
do not lose interest from delays in response. This is
accomplished by making one of the changes mentioned above to
the system. With the judgmental method, the system
processing rate may be increased by increasing worker
productivity, if possible. Fixed costs would not noticeably
increase. The marginal variable costs to consider would be
increases in manpower costs and the costs of additional Type
I and II errors made due to less time spent evaluating each
applicant. Another option would be to employ more analysts.
This would cause a greater increase in manpower costs, but
avoid the marginal Type I and II errors.
An empirical model must be specifically tailored to an
organization's requirements. Changing to an empirical method
because of increased volume would avoid the higher variable
costs inevitable with the judgmental method. But, there
would be new fixed costs associated with system development
and installation for both hardware and software. The initial
investment required for the development and implementation of
a credit scoring system, including hardware and software, is
an incremental cost that can easily exceed the marginal
benefits derived during the life of the system.
The potential costs of Type I and Type II errors should
also be considered when selecting an evaluation method.
Credit scoring categorizes credit or job applicants. To be
entrusted with assets inordinately sizable in value (e.g.,
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currency in an armored car or schematic diagrams for
cryptographic equipment), applicants should not be considered
financially responsible simply because they have a collection
of personal traits that indicates they are members of a
trustworthy group. The costs of Type I and II errors under a
credit scoring system take on greater significance under such
circumstances. The judgmental method does not assure
elimination of such errors, but on an individual evaluation
basis it has a better probability of avoiding them [Ref . 66]
.
The organization with these considerations must compare the
potential cost savings from reducing significant Type I and
Type II error costs with the marginal costs of changing to
each system evaluated. The benefit of having the low
variable cost of a credit scoring system for evaluating such
high trust individuals could be far outweighed by the losses
suffered by even one costly Type II error. A combination of
both methods, such as the Credit Analysis Model, could prove
to be the least costly. For instance, having two extreme
cutoff scores with judgmental evaluation for those applicants
falling between them might be the optimal solution.
All of the empirically derived models surveyed weigh
quantifiable variables in an attempt to label their
significance as predictors of good or bad risks. They also
utilize a numerical cutoff where the total cost of rejecting
good applicants and accepting bad ones is minimized.
However, the models do not incorporate the process expense
discussed in Chapter I. The models' designers presume such
expense is worthwhile if the organization is considering the
model for adaptation. The actual costs of adapting these
models is affected by the amount of tailoring required by the
individual organization.
The particular method and model of determining personal
financial responsibility chosen by a private sector
organization is a function of the total costs, including lost
benefits, of that method. Even the costs incurred to
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evaluate the costs of using a particular model must be
included in the decision process. The total costs of a
particular method are a function of the required applicant
processing rate and the significance of Type I and II errors.
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